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Abstract. Control flow obfuscation (CFO) alters the control flow path
of a program without altering its semantics. Existing literature has pro-
posed several techniques; however, a quick survey reveals a lack of clarity
in the types of techniques proposed, and how many are unique. What is
also unclear is whether there is a disparity in the theory and practice of
CFO. In this paper, we systematically study CFO techniques proposed
for Java programs, both from papers and commercially available tools.
We evaluate 13 obfuscators using a dataset of 16 programs with vary-
ing software characteristics, and different obfuscator parameters. Each
program is carefully reverse engineered to study the effect of obfusca-
tion. Our study reveals that there are 36 unique techniques proposed in
the literature and 7 from tools. Three of the most popular commercial
obfuscators implement only 13 of the 36 techniques in literature. Thus
there appears to be a gap between the theory and practice of CFO. We
propose a novel classification of the obfuscation techniques based on the
underlying component of a program that is transformed. We identify
the techniques that are potent against reverse engineering attacks, both
from the perspective of a human analyst and an automated program
decompiler. Our analysis reveals that majority of the tools do not imple-
ment these techniques, thus defeating the protection obfuscation offers.
We furnish examples of select techniques and discuss our findings. To
the best of our knowledge, we are the first to assemble such a research.
This study will be useful to software designers to decide upon the best
techniques to use based upon their needs, for researchers to understand
the state-of-the-art and for commercial obfuscator developers to develop
new techniques.
Keywords: Code Obfuscation, Control Flow Obfuscation, Java, Opaque
Predicate
1 Introduction
Obfuscation is a program transformation technique that renders a program un-
readable to a human while preserving its semantics. A software developer uses
static code obfuscation techniques to secure code and data from reverse engineer-
ing attacks. There are three types of obfuscation- lexical, data and control flow
obfuscation. Lexical obfuscation replaces class, field and method identifiers with
new random identifiers or words from a dictionary. Data obfuscation modifies
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data structures used by a program. Control flow obfuscation (CFO) alters the
control flow path of a program. Malware authors use obfuscation to impede secu-
rity analysts from reverse engineering their code or to evade automated program
analyzers.
In this paper, we focus on control flow obfuscation techniques. While existing
literature proposes several techniques, the differences between them is unclear.
What is also unknown is if there is a disparity in the theory and practice of CFO.
This knowledge can aid software developers to decide on the best techniques to
use to secure their code. Commercial obfuscator developers and researchers can
use this knowledge to advance the state-of-the-art and steer research in this area.
There are a few existing surveys on control flow obfuscation [26],[19],[27],
[24],[11] [16]. Colberg et al. propose groundbreaking work on the taxonomy
of obfuscating transformations. They classify 15 control flow transformations
into four types - Opaque Predicate, Computation Transformation, Aggregation
Transformation and Ordering Transformations. However, their classification is
based on theoretical foundations alone. Schrittwieser et al. [16] classifies obfus-
cation techniques into three categories- data obfuscation, static code rewriting
and dynamic code rewriting. They survey literature to analyze the strength of
obfuscation against common adverserial goals.
Balakrishnan et al. [24] presents a literature survey of all code obfuscation
techniques used to thwart static analysis and program disassembly. However, all
the CFO techniques they propose is also discussed by Colberg et al. [26]. You
et al. [11] discusses a survey of obfuscation techniques in Windows malware bi-
naries. Majumdar et al. [27] survey the strengths and weaknesses of two CFO
techniques - control flow flattening and opaque predicates. Xu et al. [48] com-
pares and contrasts code-oriented and model-oriented obfuscation techniques to
conclude that there are no secure and usable obfuscation techniques. Lim [46]
evaluates various code obfuscation techniques and measures performance of each.
Low et al. [19] discusses ways to create resilient and stealthy opaque predicates.
In this paper, we systematize knowledge of control flow obfuscation on Java
programs by studying the techniques proposed in the literature and those im-
plemented by obfuscation tools. We assemble a list of known techniques into a
single study and classify it into 5 categories based on the component (or level)
of a program on which the transformation is applied. Though we use the tax-
onomy proposed by Colberg et al. [26] as the basis of our research, we deviate
substantially in our classification. We evaluate 13 obfuscation tools and deter-
mine that only 6 are viable for analysis. The remaining obfuscators were either
unavailable for download, end-of-lived or had unresolvable program errors that
made it unusable. Obfuscators used for Android programs can also be used for
Java applications. However, certain Android obfuscators will not work on Java
bytecode. Hence we evaluate tools that can obfuscate Java programs only.
In order to evaluate obfuscators, we choose a sample set of 16 programs with
varying control flow properties. Each obfuscator is repeatedly applied to the 16
sample programs by varying their configuration parameters. The bytecode of the
obfuscated program is then manually analyzed and compared with that of the
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original program to tabulate our findings. Wherever possible, we confirm our
results with any documentation provided by the tool. We apply no lexical or
data obfuscation and restrict our analysis to CFO only.
From our study, we identified a total of 43 unique techniques, 36 from liter-
ature and 7 from tools. Of the 36 techniques from literature, 12 are not imple-
mented in any of the tools. Three of the most popular commercial obfuscators
implement only 13 of the 36 techniques from the literature. Thus there appears
to be a gap between the theory and practice of CFO. We assess the potency of
each technique from the perspective of a human analyst and a program decom-
piler. We determine that techniques that are applied on a basic block are the
most potent. However, majority of the techniques do not implement them, thus
defeating the reliability of obfuscation. We identify the most popular techniques
in tools and identify those that are incorrectly cited as control flow obfuscating.
In the end, we discuss our findings from this study.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
– We survey literature for CFO techniques and identify 36 unique techniques
from literature. We furnish examples of select techniques and identify those
that are incorrectly cited as control flow obfuscating.
– We evaluate 13 obfuscators and identify the 6 viable tools that can control
flow obfuscate Java programs.
– We evaluate each tool on a set of 16 programs with varying software charac-
teristics by repeated application of each obfuscator with varying configura-
tion parameters. We identify 7 novel techniques. Three of the most popular
commercial obfuscators implement only 13 of the 36 techniques. Thus there
appears to be a gap between the theory and practice of CFO. We also identify
the most commonly applied obfuscation techniques in tools.
– We propose a classification of the 43 techniques based on the component of a
program that is transformed. We discuss the potency of the techniques, and
identify those that are resilient to decompilers. We determine that majority
of the obfuscators do not implement these techniques, thus defeating its
purpose.
2 Running Example
Listing 1.1 is an iterative implementation of a binary search program in Java.
The program will be used as the running example for the remainder of this
paper. The example has all the components present in a typical program such as
if-else condition, loop etc. The function binarySearch takes two parameters as
input - an array and the element to be searched. It returns the index at which
the element was found and −1 otherwise.
3 Techniques in Literature
In this section we discuss techniques found in the literature grouped by the
obfuscating paradigm used. Wherever possible, we provide examples of each
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technique using the running example. The code snippet on the left shows the
original code. Obfuscated code is on the right. Examples for some techniques
have been omitted when it is similar to already stated techniques or when there
are other literature that cites them.
Listing 1.1. Running Example
1 class FindElement{
2 static int binarySearch(int arr[], int x){
3 int l = 0, r = arr.length - 1;
4 while (l <= r){
5 int m = l + (r-l)/2;
6 if (arr[m] == x) // Check if x is present at mid
7 return m+1;
8 if (arr[m] < x) // If x greater , ignore left half
9 l = m + 1;
10 else // If x is smaller , ignore right half
11 r = m - 1;
12 }
13 return -1;
14 }
15 }
16 class BinarySearch extends FindElement{
17 public void printResult(int result ,boolean isPresent) {
18 if(isPresent == false)
19 System.out.println("Element not present");
20 else
21 System.out.println("Element was found at index " + result );
22 }
23 public static void main(String args []){
24 FindElement ob1=new FindElement ();
25 BinarySearch ob2=new BinarySearch ();
26 boolean isPresent=false;
27 int arr[] = new int[args.length ];
28 if (args == null) return;
29 for (int i = 0; i < args.length; i++)
30 arr[i] = Integer.parseInt(args[i]);
31
32 //print the array
33 for (int i =0; i < arr.length; i++)
34 System.out.println(arr[i]);
35 int index = ob1.binarySearch(arr , 10);
36 if(index !=-1){
37 isPresent=true;
38 ob2.printResult(index ,isPresent );
39 }
40 else
41 ob2.printResult(index ,isPresent );
42 }
43 }
3.1 Using Opaque Predicates
An opaque predicate is a predicate whose value is known apriori to the ob-
fuscator. There are several ways in which an opaque predicate can be used to
obfuscate a program [31], [1], [2], [3], [4], [10], [12], [13], [16], [17], [21], [26], [27],
[28], [29], [30], [34], [35], [36], [37], [41], [42], [43], [44], [46]. Below we discuss the
techniques that use opaque predicates. Existing literature also proposes alge-
braic techniques to create resilient opaque predicates; however, we do not study
resilience of predicates in this work.
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1. Extending conditionals. An opaque predicate is inserted into a conditional
expression of either an if-else statement or a loop. Here inserting the opaque
predicate does not alter the evaluation of the expression [25], [26].
2. Adding Redundant Operands. Opaque variables or expressions are added as
operands to arithmetic expressions [25], [26].
3. Dead Code Insertion. An opaque predicate that guards a set of statements
is inserted into the program in such a way that the code block guarded by
the predicate is never executed (dead code) [6], [10], [11], [15], [16], [20], [26],
[40], [41], [44].
The example below shows all three techniques discussed above. In the obfus-
cated program, the original if statement is modified by adding an opaquely false
predicate denoted by the variable bool. The arithmetic expression of the return
statement is changed to also use a redundant operand called redop. The obfus-
cated code also contains an additional if statement guarded by the predicate
bool whose consequent never gets executed.
if (arr[m] == x)
return m+1;
boolean bool;
int redop = 1;
if (arr[m] == x && !bool)
if(bool){
/* deadcode */
return 0;
}
return (m+1) * redop;
}
3.2 Irrelevant Code Insertion
In this technique, the obfuscator inserts a set of irrelevant statements into the
program [16]. Unlike Dead Code Insertion, the program executes the inserted
statements. However, they may be irrelevant to it, or not present in the original
program. The string variable str is the irrelevant code in the example.
if (isPresent == false)
System.out.println("Element
not present");
if (isPresent == false) {
String str="Hello World!";
System.out.println("Element
not present");
}
3.3 Ordering obfuscation.
Ordering obfuscation changes the order of evaluation of expressions, loops, state-
ments or methods while preserving dependencies [10], [16], [18], [25], [26], [46].
1. Reordering Expressions. This technique changes the order of evaluation of
sub-expressions without changing its valuation. The example below shows
how to obfuscate a conditional of the if statement.
if (arr[m] < x)
l = m + 1;
if (x >= arr[m])
l = m + 1;
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2. Reordering Loop. The example shows how to change the evaluation of a loop
index.
for(int i=0;i<arr.length;i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
for(int i=arr.length -1;i>=0;i--)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
3. Reordering Statements. In this technique, an obfuscator reorders statements
within a basic block to preserve dependencies [40], [44].
4. Reordering Code Blocks. This technique reorders basic blocks while preserv-
ing dependencies.
5. Reordering Methods. This techniques changes the order of its subroutines
[11], [40]. This technique can generate n! different variants of a program,
where n is the number of subroutines. This approach moves the structural
position of the method in a file.
3.4 Instruction Substitution.
In this technique, the obfuscator replaces a sequence of instructions with an
alternate sequence of semantically equivalent instructions [6], [11], [20], [40]. For
instance, the goto at line 47 is replaced with iload 2 and ifeq instructions.
47 : goto 107
50 : iload_1
107: return
66 : iload_2
67 : ifeq 129
70 : iload_1
129 : return
A specific implementation of this technique has been mentioned in [50] called
the Replacing Goto obfuscation. In this technique goto instructions are replaced
with conditional branch instructions.
3.5 Control Flow Flattening
This technique works by first flattening the control flow graph of a program such
that all the basic blocks have the same successor and predecessor. A dispatcher
variable is then introduced to guide the control flow of the program [1], [3], [4], [6],
[7], [12], [13], [14], [21], [22], [25], [34], [35], [37], [38], [39], [47]. In the example, the
original code snippet has two basic blocks. The control flow flattened program
encapsulates both the basic blocks into a switch block with each basic block
forming a case statement. The dispatcher variable here is var. When var = 2,
control flow enters the second case statement that contains the first basic block.
int arr[] = {2, 3, 4, 10, 40};
for (int i =0; i < arr.length; i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
int var=2;
while(var !=0){
switch(var){
case 1:
for(int i =0;i<arr.length;i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
var=0;
break;
case 2:
int arr[] = {2, 3, 4, 10, 40};
var=1;
break;
default:break;
}
}
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3.6 Method Transformation
This technique obscures method invocations. There are four types of transfor-
mation:
1. Inline Methods. The technique replaces a method invocation with the body
of the method [31], [5], [10], [15], [18], [24], [26], [44], [46]. For instance,
the body of the function printResult replaces its invocation (line 17) in the
running example.
2. Outline Methods. This technique is the inverse of inlining; it replaces a se-
quence of statements with a function call [31], [5], [10], [24], [26], [44], [46].
3. Clone Methods. This obfuscation modifies a methods call site by invoking
clones of the same method [31], [16], [24], [26]. The call to binarySearch is
obfuscated by inserting clones of the same function.
int result = binarySearch(arr , 10);
int choice =1;
int result;
if(choice ==1)
result = binarySearch1(arr , 10);
else
result = binarySearch2(arr , 10);
4. Interleave Methods. The technique merges two separate methods into a single
method [31], [26].
3.7 Replacing if(non) null instructions with try-catch blocks
The instructions ifnull and ifnonnull are used for obfuscation. The ifnull instruc-
tion checks if the topmost element on the stack is null, whereas the ifnonnull
instruction checks if the top most instruction is non-null. These instructions then
jump to a location as specified by a label. These instructions are replaced by try-
catch constructs to alter the control flow. This may be done either by inserting
a statement that will cause an exception or by explicitly throwing an exception
[32]. Below is an example of the former.
if (args == null) return;
for (int i = 0; i < args.length; i++)
arr[i] = Integer.parseInt(args[i]);
try {
for (int i = 0; i < args.length; i++)
arr[i] = Integer.parseInt(args[i]);
} catch (NullPointerException ne) {
return;
}
3.8 Loop Transformations
These transformations manipulate loops without changing their behaviour [16],
[26]. It is of four types.
1. Loop Fission. The technique splits a loop into multiple loops [21]. For in-
stance, the for loop in the original program is split into two by causing the
loops to iterate only half the array.
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for(int i=1;i<arr.length;i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
for(int i=1;i< arr.length /2;i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
for(int i=arr.length /2;
i< arr.length;i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
2. Loop Blocking. This is a well-known optimization technique used by compil-
ers for caching. Here, a loop is partitioned into small blocks. For instance,
the loop in the original program is blocked by a block of size 2.
for(int i=0;i< arr.length;i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
for (int j=0;j<arr.length;j+=2)
for(int i=j; j< min(
arr.length , j+2); i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
3. Loop Unrolling. Also known as loop unwinding, this is yet another compiler
optimization that trades space for execution speed[5], [10], [46]. It reduces
the number of iterations of a loop by increasing the size of the program. For
instance, in the obfuscated program, the print statement is unrolled.
for (int i =0; i < arr.length; i++)
System.out.println(arr[i]);
for (int i=0;i<arr.length; i=i+3) {
System.out.print(arr[i]);
System.out.println(arr[i+1]);
System.out.println(arr[i+2]);
}
4. Replace with Equivalent Codes. This obfuscation inserts, modifies or removes
statements, identifiers, and literals [33]. This is also called as Code Clone III.
In the example below, the elemet arr[i] is assigned to another variable num.
for (int i =0; i < arr.length; i++) {
System.out.println(arr[i]);
}
for (int i =0; i < arr.length; i++){
int num = arr[i];
System.out.println(num);
}
5. Code Clone-Type IV. Here code snippets are modified to produce syntac-
tically different, yet semantically identical variants [33]. For instance, an
obfuscator replaces a for loop with a while loop.
6. Inserting Dummy Loop. In this technique empty loops are inserted into the
code. An alternative implementation is combining basic blocks into a loop.
7. Intersecting Loops.This approach inserts intersecting loops into the control
flow and guarded by an opaque predicate to skip the loop [50]. The opaque
predicate causes the the inserted code to act like dead code.
3.9 Basic Block Fission
This technique splits the chosen code blocks into finer pieces and inserts opaque
predicates and goto instructions in them [50]. The use of goto may cause the
decompiler to fail in this case.
3.10 Remove Library and Program Idioms
The technique uses obfuscated version of library functions and removes/replaces
programming idioms from the original program [16], [25], [26]. For example,
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System.out.println library call is replaced with a semantically equivalent imple-
mentation that use BufferedWriter.
System.out.println("Element not
present");
BufferedWriter bw = new
BufferedWriter(new
OutputStreamWriter(System.out));
bw.write("Element not present");
3.11 Convert a Reducible to Non-Reducible Flow-graph
In this technique, instructions that have no direct correspondence with the
source language is used to obfuscate a program. This makes the transformation
language-breaking or non-reducible [26]. A commonly used approach is to use the
goto statement to express arbitrary control flow. This makes it a non-reducible
flow-graph as the Java language itself can only express structured control flow
(reducible flow-graph). This can easily be done by inserting a bogus jump to the
middle of the body of a while loop using an opaque predicate that will never
get executed. When the loop has multiple headers or entry points, it no longer
becomes structured and hence will become non-reducible.
3.12 Table Interpretation
This technique is also called as Virtualization [8], [9], [23], [42], [26]. A program’s
bytecode is converted into a custom instruction set that is executed by a VM
interpreter included within the obfuscated application. This transformation in-
duces additional runtime over head and hence is reserved only for extremely
sensitive portions of an application.
3.13 Parallelizing the Code
In this technique, multiple processes are created to execute code blocks that have
no data dependencies. This may be done either by creating dummy processes and
running them in parallel with the instructions of the program or by splitting a
sequential section of the application into multiple sections that can be executed
in parallel. Code block that have data dependencies can be parallelized using
synchronizing functions [15], [16], [25], [26].
4 Tools Evaluation
We identify 13 tools as listed in table 1 that support control flow obfuscation.
We restrict our evaluation to control flow obfuscators and exclude lexical and
data obfuscators such as Proguard. Of the 13 tools Only 6 tools are viable -
DashO, Allatori, Zelix Klassmaster, Sandmark, JMOT, and JFuscator. JBCO is
the only tool which we could not evaluate, yet is included since they furnish a
detailed documentation of their techniques. For those that were not evaluated,
we indicate why. In case of paid proprietary tools, we use their trial versions
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Table 1. List of Control Flow Obfuscators in the Study
Obfuscator Software
Version
Availability Input Evaluated
Zelix Klassmaster 6.1 Paid version Bytecode Y
Allatori 6.4 Trial version Bytecode Y
DashO 8.3.0 Trial version Bytecode Y
JBCO 2.5.0 Not-Available Bytecode N
JMOT 3.0 Open-source Bytecode Y
Sandmark 2.1 Open-source Bytecode Y
Jfuscator Unspecified Trial version Byte/Sourcecode Y
JOAD 2.1 Open-source Bytecode N
JShield Unspecified Not available Source code N
Arxan Unspecified Paid version Bytecode N
Cloakware Unspecified Not available Sourcecode N
Smokescreen 3.11 Not available Bytecode N
Codeshield 2.0 Not available Bytecode N
for evaluation, except for Zelix Klassmaster, for which we acquired a licensed
version.
In order to conduct the study, we use a set of 16 synthetic programs with
and without control flow constructs. We intended the programs to contain a
heterogeneous mix of properties. The programs have one or more of the following
characteristics: 1) non-nested if statements 2) non-nested if-else statements 3)
one/many for or while loops 4) switch-case statements 5) nested conditional
statements 6) nested try-catch blocks 7) use of complex data structures such as
hashmaps 8) variable number of methods 9) accepts user inputs. In a case where
the conditionals are nested, we introduce a nesting level of up to 3 levels.
The source/bytecode of each of the 16 programs are repeatedly supplied
as input to each control flow obfuscator for different obfuscator parameters.
We manually manually examine the bytecode output to identify the differences
between the original and the transformed programs using the javap command.
This is because, the decompiled output of a program may vary depending on
the decompiler used. Certain obfuscations also produce programs that cannot
be decompiled. Lastly, while some of the techniques do not appear to alter the
control flow of the program from the perspective of source code, it is still a
control flow obfuscation if it alters the control flow of the bytecode. We use
JD-GUI decompiler wherever possible to verify our findings.
Table 2 details the list of obfuscation techniques supported by each tool.
4.1 Zelix Klassmaster
Zelix supports 3 levels of control flow obfuscation- light, normal and aggressive,
and data obfuscation. Zelix uses only techniques proposed by the literature.
They using static boolean variables as opaque predicates and insert emtpty if
statements guarded by opaquely false predicates. Zelix also reorders the constant
pool index, which is a structural obfuscation technique.
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4.2 Allatori
This obfuscator is available as a plugin for Eclipse. It supports incremental ob-
fuscation of code to allow for consistency with the previous obfuscated versions
of a program.
Table 2. List of Techniques from Tools
Obfuscator Obfuscation Technique
Zelix Irrelevant Code Insertion
Extending Conditionals
Opaque Branch Insertion
Opaque Predicate Insertion
Dead Code Insertion
Instruction Substitution
Convert Reducible to Irreducible
Flowgraph
Replacing if(non) Null Instruc-
tions with TCB
Reordering Statements
Allatori Method Reordering
Instruction Substitution
Reordering Statements
Replacing if(non) Null Instruc-
tions with TCB
Code Clone Type IV
Using Opaque Predicate
Dead Code Insertion
Branch Inversion
DashO Opaque Branch Insertion
Dead Code Insertion
Reordering Statements
Goto Instruction Augmentation
Insert Dummy Loop
Replacing if(non) Null Instruc-
tions with TCB
JMOT Data Sanitization
JFuscator Irrelevant Code Insertion
Instruction Substitution
Obfuscator Obfuscation Technique
JBCO Reordering the load instructions
above the if instructions
Replacing if(non) Null Instruc-
tions with TCB
Adding Dead Code Switch Stmt.
Building API Buffer Methods
Building Lib Buffer Classes
Goto Instruction Augmentation
Converting Branches to jsr Instns.
Finding and Reusing Duplicate Se-
quences
Disobeying Constructor Conven-
tions
Partially Trapping Switch Stmts.
Combining Try Blocks with Catch
Blocks
Indirecting if Instructions
Sandmark Boolean Splitter
Reordering Expressions
Building API Buffer Methods
Split Objects
Class Splitter
Interleave Methods
Inline Methods
Convert Reducible to Irreducible
Flow Graph
Reordering Statements
Opaque Branch Insertion
Dynamic Inliner
Dead Code Insertion
4.3 JBCO
JBCO [45], [49] is an obfuscator developed by Sable Group, KTH University,
that proposes a set of techniques specifically for bytecode obfuscation. The tool
is a part of the Soot framework. We were not able to successfully evaluate all
the techniques due to dependency errors while running the tool. However, the
techniques they have created have been discussed in detail with examples in [49].
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One thing to note is that depending on the specification of the virtual machine
in which bytecode is run, some techniques may cease to work.
1. Reordering load instruction above if instructions. This technique moves a
local variable common to both the if and else condition to outside the if-
else statement, thus removing redundant code along the branches.
2. Adding Dead Code Switch Statements. It inserts a switch statement using an
opaquely false predicate.
3. Finding and Reusing Duplicate Sequences. This technique manipulates the
fact that duplicate bytecode sequences occur in various parts of the code.
The code sequences can be replaced with a single switched instance, thus
altering the control flow as well as reducing the code size.
4. Partially Trapping Switch Statements. Traps are conceptually similar to ex-
ception handlers, except that they are specific to bytecode. One way to
obfuscate using trap handlers is to encapsulate a sequence of bytecode in-
structions that may belong to disparate set of code blocks, into a single
trap handler. For instance, code blocks belonging to case statements of a
switch-case block can be handled by a single trap handler.
5. Disobeying Constructor Conventions. This technique manipulates invoca-
tions to super class constructor calls. For instance, invocation to a super
class constructor is placed inside a try-catch block.
6. Combining Try Blocks with Catch Blocks. While the try block must be fol-
lowed by the catch block in the source code, at the bytecode, the ordering
of the blocks is irrelevant. For the same reason, multiple try-catch blocks
maybe combined, or a catch block may precede a try block.
7. Indirecting if Instructions. In this technique, the if branch is indirected
through a goto instruction. To avoid the goto from being removed by the
compiler, it is enclosed within a try-catch block.
8. Building API Buffer Methods. In this technique, a buffer method is inserted
between the caller and the invocation to a Java API call.
9. Building Library Buffer Classes. The obfuscator inserts a buffer class (with
methods) in between a caller and the callee library class, thus introducing
another level of indirection.
10. Goto Instruction Augmentation. It splits a method into two sequential parts,
uses goto to change the control flow of the program. The parts may optionally
be reordered.
11. Converting branches to jsr instructions. jsr instruction is similar to goto the
only difference being that jsr pushes a return address to the stack. In this
technique, if and goto targets are replaced with jsr instructions. The return
address is saved in a register for use after returning from a jsr jump. jsr is
supported only in Java version 6.0 and below as per the Oracle Documen-
tation. In our experimental evaluation, we were unable to reproduce this
obfuscation technique despite lowering the Java version.
4.4 DashO
DashO extensively uses try-catch blocks for altering the control flow of a pro-
gram. The number of try-catch blocks can be varied from 1 to 10. It does not
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obfuscate compiler-generated classes such as the default constructor. DashO also
uses nop instructions to increase code size.
4.5 JMOT
JMOT supports 4 levels of obfuscation - Light, Normal, Heavy and Insane. The
tool has no control flow obfuscation techniques, and only supports data sanitiza-
tion to protect strings used in the program. Strings are passed through a series
of function calls named as hax0, hax1 . . . hax7. However, this in effect alters the
control flow of a program. We mention this for completeness here.
public void printResult(int
result ,boolean isPresent ){
if(isPresent == false)
System.out.println("Element not
present");
...
}
if (isPresent == false) {
System.out.println(
BinarySearch.hax0(
BinarySearch.hax1(
...
BinarySearch.hax7(
"Element not present")))))))));
...
}
4.6 JFuscator
JFuscator is the only obfuscator that gives the developer the choice to obfuscate
specific methods or the program as a whole.
4.7 Sandmark
Sandmark is an open source tool developed by University of Arizona that can
obfuscate Java programs. Though the tool has been discontinued since JDK
version 1.4 (in 2004), we ported the tool to support JDK 1.8. To obfuscate,
Sandmark provides a list of techniques to choose from. From a total of 15 tech-
niques, we identify 4 that are novel. Given below are the techniques previously
seen in literature, but noted below due to minor implementation differences.
1. Interleave Methods. (Called as Method Merger in Sandmark). In the tool,
this is implemented as two different techniques - one that interleaves public
static methods with the same signature and the other that interleaves all
methods.
2. Inline Methods. (Called as Inliner in Sandmark). In the tool only static
methods are inlined.
3. Simple Opaque Predicate. This is a composition of the techniques Extending
Conditionals and Adding Redundant Operands.
4. Static Method Bodies. This is same as Building API Buffer Methods, the
difference being that it splits all non-static methods into a static helper
method that will be invoked by a non-static stub.
5. Branch Inversion. This technique is a specific implementation of the tech-
nique called Reordering Expressions, where the conditional expression of an
if statement is negated.
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6. Buggy Code. Similar to Dead Code Insertion, except that a copy of a basic
block is taken to introduce a bug which is then guarded by an opaquely false
predicate
The following techniques are novel:
1. Dynamic Inliner (Similar to Inline Methods) This technique uses instanceof
checks to perform method inlining at runtime.
2. Boolean Splitter. It modifies all uses and definitions of boolean variables and
arrays. In the example below, the boolean isPresent is obfuscated.
public void printResult(int result ,
boolean isPresent ){
if(isPresent == false)
...
}
public void printResult(int arg1 ,
boolean arg2){
boolean bool1 = (int)
(Math.random () * 2.0D);
boolean arg1=false;
if (!( arg1 ˆ bool1))
...
}
3. Split Objects. An object of a class is split into two and are linked together
by a field. In the example below, the FindElement object ob1 is split. In the
obfuscated program, another object called next0 is created.
class BinarySearch extends
FindElement{
main (){
FindElement ob1=new
FindElement ( ) ;
. . .
} }
class FindElement{
public FindElement0 next0 ;
public FindElement ( ){
i f ( this . next0 == null )
this . next0 =
new FindElement0 ( ) ;
}
4. Class Splitter. The body of a class is split in such a way that methods
and fields of the class are moved into its superclass. In the example, the
printResult method of BinarySearch class is moved to its superclass.
class FindElement {
. . .
}
class BinarySearch
extends FindElement{
public void pr in tResu l t ( . . . ) {
. . .
} }
class FindElement {
public void pr in tResu l t ( . . . ) {
. . .
} }
class BinarySearch
extends FindElement{
}
5 Discussion
From our study we identified 36 unique techniques from literature and 7 from
tools. Three of the most popular and well-supported commercial obfuscators
Zelix, Allatori and DashO implement only 13 of the 36 techniques. Thus there
appears to be a gap between the theory and practice of CFO.
Table 3 furnishes a classification of the techniques based on the component
(or level) of a program at which an obfuscation transformation is applied. We
identify 5 different components (or levels) of a program (column 1) - Expres-
sion (such as conditional expressions), Statement, Basic Block, Method, Class.
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Table 3. Classification & Analysis Overview
Component Obfuscation Technique Liter. Tools Both DR Level
1. Expression Extending Conditionals 3 3 3 N Opaque Predicate
Adding Redundant Operands 3 3 3 N Opaque Predicate
Reordering Expressions 3 3 3 N Ordering
2. Statement Reordering Statements 3 3 3 N Ordering
Remove Lib. and Program Idioms 3 3 3 N Substitution
Instruction Substitution 3 3 3 N Substitution
Replacing if(Non) Null Instructions
With Try-Catch Block
3 3 3 N Substitution
Converting Branches to jsr Instr. 3 3 3 N Substitution
3. Basic Block Opaque Branch Insertion 7 3 7 N Opaque Predicate
Dead Code Insertion 3 3 3 N Opaque Predicate
Adding Dead Code Switch Stmts. 3 3 3 N Opaque Predicate
Reordering Loops 3 7 7 N Ordering
Reordering Code Blocks 3 7 7 N Ordering
Finding and Reusing Duplicate Seq. 3 3 3 N Ordering
Reorder Load Instrs. Above if Instr. 3 3 3 N Ordering
Loop Fission 3 7 7 N Loop Transf.
Loop Blocking 3 7 7 N Loop Transf.
Loop Unrolling 3 7 7 N Loop Transf.
Intersecting Loop 3 7 7 Y Loop Transf.
Replace with Equivalent Codes 3 3 3 N Substitution
Code Clone Type IV 3 3 3 N Substitution
Basic Block Fission 3 7 7 Y Code Insertion
Insert Dummy Loop 3 3 3 N Code Insertion
Goto Instruction Augmentation 3 3 3 Y Code Insertion
Irrelevant Code Insertion 3 3 3 N Code Insertion
Control Flow Flattening 3 7 7 N Code Insertion
Boolean Splitter 7 3 7 N Code Insertion
Convert Reducible to Non-reducible
Flowgraph
3 3 3 Y Code Insertion
Partially Trapping Switch Stmts 3 3 3 Y Code Insertion
Disobeying Constructor Conventions 3 3 3 Y Code Insertion
Combining Try Blocks with Their
Catch Blocks
3 3 3 N Code Insertion
Indirecting if Instructions 7 3 7 Y Code Insertion
4. Method Inline method 3 3 3 N Method Transf.
Outline Method 3 7 7 N Method Transf.
Clone Method 3 7 7 N Method Transf.
Interleave Methods 3 3 3 N Method Transf.
Dynamic Inliner 7 3 7 N Method Transf.
Building API Buffer Methods 7 3 7 N Method Transf.
Table Interpretation 3 7 7 Y Method Transf.
Parallelizing the Code 3 7 7 N Method Transf.
5. Class Split Objects 7 3 7 N Class Transf.
Class Splitter 7 3 7 N Class Transf.
Building Library Buffer Classes 3 3 3 N Class Transf.
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We indicate whether the technique is proposed in the literature, tools or both
(columns 3-5). In column 6, we note whether these techniques allow a program
to be decompiled into a source code equivalent, thus facilitating reverse engi-
neering. Finally, we also note the obfuscating paradigm used in column 7. The
foundation for the paradigms is obtained from a prior study by Colberg et al.
on taxonomy of obfuscating transformations [26].
We assess the potency of these techniques. Colberg et al. [26] defines potency
as a measure of how difficult it is for a human reader to understand the obfus-
cated program. We augment that measure to include the ability of a decompiler
to decompile an obfuscated bytecode into its equivalent source. This is because
such techniques will inherently lack structure and thus will be unreadable. We
determine that Table Interpretation (Virtualization) is the most potent as the
knowledge of how the interpreter will execute the program is with the developer
of the obfuscator itself. However, implementing such an obfuscator incurs a huge
overhead. In all the other techniques, manual disassembly of the program can
leak (at least partially) its proprietary knowledge.
12 techniques proposed in the literature is not available in any of the tools. 8
of those are transformations applied to a basic block. Basic block transformations
are difficult to implement due to the challenge entailed in preserving inter-block
dependencies. However, they are also the most potent. Any technique that gen-
erates a non-structured control flow at the bytecode level cannot be decompiled.
We identify that the following 7 techniques causes a decompiler to fail - Goto
Instruction Augmentation, Conversion of Reducible to Irreducible Flow Graphs,
Intersecting Loops, Basic Block Fission, Partially Trapping Switch Statements,
Disobeying Constructor Conventions and Indirecting if Instructions. Loop block-
ing, though it can be decompiled, is potent, as it makes use of nested loops.
Nested loops make use of nested labels and gotos that deters the readability of
a program for a human analyst.
All the other techniques that use ordering, substitution, class and method
transformation paradigms are effective to create variants of a program, but does
not deter the readability of a program. Literature cites method reordering as a
CFO technique. However, method reordering only alters the class structurally
and does not alter its control flow. Hence this cannot be classified as a CFO
technique. We however list it here for completeness. Transformations on expres-
sions and statements are the most common and easiest to implement. Opaque
predicates can be potent if the predicate used to secure a conditional is potent.
None of the techniques can be deobfuscated without the original program.
However, techniques that use opaque predicates such as dead code, opaque
branch insertion, redundant operand etc. are common compiler optimizations
that can be used to deobfuscate. A deobfuscator can also remove control flow
edges that generate non-reducible flow graphs, to generate structured programs
so as to enable a decompiler to generate source code.
Of the 6 tools we evaluated, Zelix, Allatori, DashO and JMOT can be used
by software developers to control flow obfuscate their code. We determine that
Zelix is the most potent as it is the only tool that implements language breaking
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transformations. Though Allatori and DashO are comparable in their implemen-
tations, programs generated by Allatori mask their obfuscation techniques well.
DashO relies on try-catch blocks (TCB). They insert a varying number of TCBs
depending on the level of obfuscation. This approach does not substantially mar
the readability of a program. Although Sandmark provides the most number
of techniques, it is not a practically viable tool for commercial purposes. This
is because, the tool is no longer supported and not tested for versions of Java
greater than 1.4. Each tool has a unique way of inserting dead code, which is
useful to identify the obfuscator. Though JBCO has a good lineup of techniques,
it has a broken code base at the time of writing this paper and hence not usable.
JMOT is a purely command-line tool, does not support control flow obfuscation
The following techniques are common to most tools - Extending Conditionals,
Adding Redundant Operands, Opaque Predicate Insertion, Dead Code Insertion,
Irrelevant Code Insertion, Reordering Expressions, Reordering Statements, Re-
placing if(non)null instructions with try-catch blocks, and Goto Augmentation.
Aside from the 8 techniques that are decompiler resistant, none of the other tech-
niques provide enough security to prevent reverse engineering attacks. However,
majority of the tools implement none of those techniques, allowing an adversary
to defeat obfuscation.
6 Conclusion
In this research, we have surveyed existing literature and evaluated 13 tools to
identify the different control flow obfuscation techniques and their implementa-
tions. We have identified 36 unique techniques from literature and 7 from tools.
The three most popular commercial tools use only 13 of the 36 techniques, thus
showing a lag between the theory and practice of control flow of obfuscation.
We classify the 43 techniques into 5 types based on the component of a pro-
gram on which obfuscation is applied. We also discuss the obfuscating paradigm
used. Based on our analysis, we determine that transformations on a basic block
are the most potent. We identify 8 techniques that renders a program unread-
able both to a human analyst and a program decompiler. 7 of those techniques
use language breaking transformations to make a program unstructured. All the
other obfuscations are effective to create semantic variants and does not de-
ter readability of a program. Most of the obfuscators do not implement potent
techniques defeating the reliability of obfuscation. Each tool inserts their own
proprietary dead code, which a deobfuscator can use as a feature to detect the
tool. We identify the most commonly used techniques in tools and also flag those
that are not implemented. When using a composition of obfuscations, there is
a drastic increase in code size and complexity. Hence determining the optimal
amount of obfuscation such that the run-time performance and code complexity
is also optimal while preserving potency is an area that requires further work.
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